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Forcible Medication for Courtroom Competence —
The Case of Charles Sell
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
The right to refuse treatment is firmly recognized
in U.S. law.1 Competent persons have the legal right
to refuse treatment, even life-sustaining treatment,
and incompetent patients can also refuse treatment
through an advance directive, by naming a health
care agent to make decisions for them or by having
a person who knows their wishes express them.2
Competence is a legal construct, not a medical
or psychiatric one, and it is task-specific. People can
be competent to do one thing (such as refuse medical treatment) but not another (such as stand trial
and participate in their own defense). Grisso and
Appelbaum capture the essence of incompetence as
follows: “Incompetence constitutes a status of the
individual that is defined by functional deficits (due
to mental illness, mental retardation, or other mental conditions) judged to be sufficiently great that
the person currently cannot meet the demands of
a specific decision-making situation.”3
Despite these well-understood principles, some
refusals of treatment by persons in state custody remain controversial. Most notably, these involve the
forcible administration of psychotropic drugs to a
person who is competent to refuse these medications for the purposes of making an accused person
competent to stand trial or of maintaining order in
prisons. Because any forced treatment of a person in
state custody confronts physicians with a potential
problem of “dual loyalty,” crucial issues in medical
ethics are at stake. All these issues were in play when
the Supreme Court decided the case of dentist
Charles Thomas Sell in the summer of 2003.

the case against charles sell
In the majority opinion written by Justice Stephen
G. Breyer, the Court describes Sell as a former practicing dentist who had “a long and unfortunate history of mental illness,” beginning with inpatient
psychiatric treatment in 1982 after he told physicians that the gold he was using for fillings “had
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been contaminated by communists.”4 On other occasions he complained that various public officials
were trying to kill him, and in 1997 he told a lawenforcement official that he had spoken to God and
that “God told me [for] every [Federal Bureau of Investigation] person I kill, a soul will be saved.”4
These beliefs, among others, led psychiatrists to diagnose Sell as having a “delusional disorder.”5
Shortly after making the comment about the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Sell was charged
with submitting false insurance claims. A federal
magistrate ordered a psychiatric examination, after
which the magistrate concluded that Sell was “currently competent” to stand trial but might have a
“psychotic episode” in the future. He released Sell
on bail. A grand jury later charged Sell (and his wife)
with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering. In early 1998, the government claimed that
Sell was trying to intimidate a witness. The magistrate held a bail-revocation hearing at which he
described Sell’s behavior as “totally out of control,”
including “screaming and shouting,” using “personal insults” and “racial epithets,” and spitting in
the magistrate’s face.4 Sell’s bail was revoked, and
in April 1998 the grand jury issued a new indictment
charging him with attempting to murder both the
FBI agent who had arrested him and a former employee who planned to testify against him.
In early 1999, Sell asked the magistrate to reconsider his competence to stand trial. He was examined at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners
in Springfield, Missouri. Thereafter, the magistrate
found him “mentally incompetent to stand trial”
and ordered that Sell be hospitalized for treatment
for up to four months, to determine “whether there
was a substantial probability that [he] would attain
the capacity to allow his trial to proceed.” The test
for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with
his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as a factual under-
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standing of the proceedings against him.”6 Two
months later, the staff of the psychiatric facility recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication.
Sell refused, and the medical staff sought judicial
approval to administer psychotropic drugs against
Sell’s will. This doctor–patient standoff is the subject of the lawsuit.4

have been simply a manifestation of his delusional
disorder), the court ruled that the government has
“an essential interest in bringing the defendant to
trial” that justified using forced treatment so long
as it was “medically appropriate.”5
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Sell’s appeal
of this decision in order to determine whether the
“forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to
render Sell competent to stand trial [would] unconsell’s mental condition
stitutionally deprive him of his ‘liberty’ to reject medThe Supreme Court reviewed the lengthy medical ical treatment.”4
and procedural history. A reviewing psychiatrist at
the medical center held a hearing and authorized
precedents
forced administration of drugs, for two reasons: because Sell was “mentally ill and dangerous, and The Court based its decision on two prior Supreme
medication [was] necessary to treat the mental ill- Court cases, one involving forced medication of a
ness; and so that Sell would ‘become competent for prisoner, the other forced medication of a defendant
trial.’” The reviewing official at the medical center charged with murder. In the first case, Washington v.
agreed.4
Harper,7 the Court decided that a prisoner’s right
In the fall of 1999, the magistrate who had sent “to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsySell to the medical center held a hearing at Sell’s re- chotic drugs” could be overcome if the state could
quest and heard testimony that Sell had approached demonstrate that forced drug treatment was “reaone of the nurses at the medical center, “suggesting sonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
that he was in love with her,” and “criticized her for Such interests did not include using drugs as punhaving nothing to do with him.” The medical cen- ishment but did include using them to maintain orter’s physicians testified that, given Sell’s diagnosis der in the prison environment. As for due process
and current beliefs, this behavior “indicated that he in making this assessment, the Court concluded
was a safety risk even within the institution.”4 He that no judicial review or legal representation was
was moved to a locked cell. A year later, the magis- required — only the determination by physicians
trate concluded that Sell was “a danger to himself that the drugs were in the inmate’s best medical
and others at the institution” and that “antipsychot- interests. In the words of the Court’s ruling, “an
ic medication [was] the only way to render him less inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and
dangerous.” He also concluded that the benefits of perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to
these drugs “far outweigh[ed] any risks” and that medicate to be made by medical professionals rathdrug treatment was the only way likely to render er than a judge.”7
The other case, Riggins v. Nevada,8 involved the
Sell competent to stand trial. He therefore ordered
forced medication, but he stayed the order so that review of a trial court’s authorization of the forcible
Sell could appeal to federal court, which Sell did.4 administration of psychotropic drugs to a defenA district court judge determined in April 2001 dant accused of murder so that he would be comthat the magistrate’s finding of “dangerousness” petent to stand trial. The Court ruled that the state
was “clearly erroneous,” noting that Sell had been could overcome the defendant’s liberty interest in
returned to an open ward. Nonetheless, the judge avoiding forced medication only if it could demonfound that forced use of antipsychotic drugs was strate an “essential” or “overriding” state interest
“medically appropriate” and that it was the only “vi- and that rendering a person accused of murder comable hope of rendering the defendant competent to petent to stand trial might qualify as such an overstand trial.”4 A year later, a divided court of appeals riding interest. Due process required that the prospanel agreed that Sell was not dangerous (noting ecution demonstrate to a judge that “the treatment
that his behavior “amounted at most to an inap- with antipsychotic medication was medically appropropriate familiarity and even infatuation with a priate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
nurse”). Focusing only on the fraud charges (not the essential for the [defendant’s] own safety or the
attempted-murder charges, which the court de- safety of others.”8 The Court reversed Riggins’s conclined to consider because it thought the threats may viction, because the trial court had not taken into
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account the possibility of trial prejudice resulting
from the effects of medication, including the effect
of psychotropic drugs on the defendant’s “behavior and demeanor.”8 The defendant might, for example, appear to the jury to be a calm, cold-blooded killer owing to the effects of the medication.
From these two prior decisions, the Court summarized the state of the law before Sell:
Harper and Riggins indicated that the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking into account less intrusive alternatives, is
necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests.4

the decision

the guidelines for forced
medication
Applying these cases to Sell, the Court concluded
that a judge could order a defendant involuntarily
medicated for the sole purpose of making the defendant competent to stand trial, if the judge made
four findings. The first finding is that “important
governmental interests are at stake.” These interests include not only bringing persons accused of
serious crimes to trial in a timely manner but also
making sure that the trial is a fair one. The second
is that the forced medication “will significantly further” those state interests by making it “substantially likely” that the defendant will be rendered
competent to stand trial and “substantially unlikely” that the drug will have effects that could render
the trial unfair. The third finding is that the involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests in that “any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results.” The fourth is that the administration of the
drug is “medically appropriate, i.e., in situations in
the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition.” Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects and success rates must
be considered.4
The Court underscored that these four findings
applied only to forced medication intended to render a defendant competent to stand trial. The criteria
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for these findings need not be met if the purpose of
forced medication is related to a prisoner’s dangerousness or to “the individual’s own interests where
refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.”4
The Court also noted that medical experts are likely
to be most persuasive on the issue of the usefulness
of particular drugs to control a patient’s potentially
dangerous behavior, whereas they will be less informed about “the more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence.”4

Because the district court judge had found Sell not
dangerous to himself or to others, and the appeals
court had agreed, the Supreme Court assumed that
Sell was not dangerous. On the basis of this assumption, the Court overturned the decision of the appeals court to approve the forced medication of Sell
“solely to render Sell competent to stand trial.” No
determination had been made by either the magistrate or the district court judge about the fairness of
a trial given the likely effects of specific drugs on
Sell, and this failure could have affected the decision. In the Court’s words, “Whether a particular
drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with
communication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability
to express emotions are matters important to determining the permissibility of medication to restore
competence, but not necessarily relevant when dangerousness is primarily at issue.”4 In addition, the
Court instructed the lower courts to consider the
fact that Sell had already been confined for a long
period of time and that this lengthy confinement
reduced the government’s interest in prosecution.4
The order to medicate Sell forcibly was accordingly
vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

the conflicting interests
This case has attracted wide interest for two main
reasons. First, it is about the power of the government to administer drugs forcibly to persons who
are competent to decline medication solely to further
a governmental interest and not for their health.
Second, the treatment involved is aimed at changing
the mental functioning of a person and thus raises
the issue of whether drugs that affect the brain
should be considered in a different way from drugs
that affect other parts of the body.
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As to the government’s power to compel medical treatment of a competent adult, virtually all
commentators and courts agree that such power
can be legitimately exercised only in extremely limited circumstances. Harper, which involved the treatment of a potentially dangerous prisoner, is an example of such circumstances.7,9 The importance
of Harper, however, is limited by the facts that states
have broad powers to ensure security inside prisons and that the prisoners’ liberty rights are highly
circumscribed already. Sell, nonetheless, seemed to
expand the decision in Harper by permitting forced
treatment of someone who has only been accused
of a crime. On the surface, the four criteria established by the Supreme Court may seem stringent.
However, the Court’s stated belief that there will be
circumstances in which a person charged with nonviolent crimes can be forcibly medicated in order to
make the person competent to stand trial means
that there are no defendants for whom forcible medication is out of bounds as a matter of constitutional
law. This is probably why both sides in Sell claimed
victory.10
I agree with the Court’s assertion that there are
circumstances in which the state’s interest in actually having a trial is very important, but I do not believe that Sell’s case should qualify. One case that
might meet this test is that of Russell Eugene
Weston, Jr., who is charged with murdering two
U.S. Capitol police officers in 1998, in an incident
that was caught on videotape.11 But the important
state interest at stake still must be articulated. Because Weston is mentally ill and dangerous, for example, he is likely to be civilly committed for a long
time — at least until he is no longer a danger to others. Thus, a criminal trial is not necessary to promote public safety. Public retribution is important,
but it may not be important enough to justify forced
medication just for the sake of a trial.
Antipsychotic drugs can have serious effects, including some that can undermine the fairness of a
trial. In this regard, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued
in a concurring opinion in Riggins that antipsychotic
medication should never be ordered for the restoration of competence unless the state can demonstrate
that the medication would not alter the defendant’s
behavior in a way that might prejudice his or her
right to a fair trial. In Kennedy’s words, “if the defendant cannot be tried without his behavior and
demeanor being affected in [a] substantial way by
involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution
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requires that society bear this cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process.”8
The second reason this case has attracted attention is that it raises the question of whether drugs
that affect the mind (and consequently competence)
should be treated differently from drugs that affect
only bodily function. Sell’s supporters argued that
forced medication implicated Sell’s First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights to be free from
governmental control of his thoughts and emotions, as well as his ability to communicate with his
lawyers. They invoked Orwell’s 1984 as an image
of government run amok and based on fear and
mind control, including the vision of “big brother”
determining how citizens should think. They also
cited the forced drugging of political prisoners in
the former Soviet Union and reportedly in China
today.12
The American Psychiatric Association, on the
other hand, took the position in its amicus brief, as
it had in Riggins, that “antipsychotic medication
should be treated [just] like other medication.”13
Were these medications treated as all others are,
however, they could never be forced on a competent
patient. In fact, the American Psychiatric Association is almost alone in its basic position that seriously mentally ill patients should be forcibly medicated as a matter of course, if necessary, to put them
on the road to recovery. The problem with this argument is that psychotropic medication is not
just like other medications, because the brain is
not just like any other organ. Brain function determines competence, and only psychotropic medications have the potential to make a person competent to stand trial. The Court quite properly rejected
the American Psychiatric Association’s argument
on this point.
All these considerations are based on the assumption that an accurate diagnosis has been made
and that the available medications have a reasonable
likelihood of restoring competence to stand trial.
Questions of diagnostic accuracy, treatment efficacy, side effects, competence, and informed consent
are all central to the role of physicians who are involved in the forcible medication of accused persons. In this case, there was credible psychiatric testimony, summarized in the opinion of the court of
appeals, that questioned the strength of the evidence
of the efficacy of psychotropic medication in treating the type of delusional disorder that had been diagnosed in Sell.5 Even the psychiatrists who testi-

www.nejm.org

may 27, 2004

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on November 29, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2004 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

legal issues in medicine

fied for the state could not promise much success; Harper, prison psychiatrists are likely to have an inone said he had a 75 percent success rate, and the stitutional bias, and thus “the mere fact that a deciother claimed only a 50 percent success rate.5
sion is made by a doctor does not make it certain
that professional judgment in fact was exercised.”7
The Supreme Court cannot resolve the forensic
the role of physicians
psychiatrist’s dual-loyalty conflict; it has only highIn Sell, as in Harper and Riggins, the Court accepted lighted the conflict by extending the circumstances
the possibility of forced medication in limited cir- under which mentally ill persons who are compecumstances, because the justices usually believe that tent to refuse medication can legally be forcibly
psychiatrists will only prescribe those psychotropic medicated. Nonetheless, psychiatrists can respond
medications that they consider to be in a defendant’s by taking the Court at its word that competent adults
best medical interests. The Court’s presumption is should not be involuntarily medicated solely for the
that physicians would not act against the interests convenience of the state, even when such “treatof their patients, even their patients who are pris- ment” is judicially sanctioned. Drugs should be preoners. Even psychiatrists such as Alan Stone, who scribed by a physician only if the physician makes
support forced medication that will restore compe- an independent judgment that treatment is in the
tence in general, think it should be used only “to re- patient’s best medical interests.
store the person’s mental health” and not for the From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
“needs of the criminal justice system.”10
Similarly, a report by Physicians for Human 1. Annas GJ. The rights of patients. 3rd ed. Carbondale: Southern
Rights on the problem of dual loyalty concluded Illinois University Press, 2004:277-92.
2. Cantor NL. Twenty-five years after Quinlan: a review of the juristhat “the health professional must place the protec- prudence of death and dying. J Law Med Ethics 2001;29:182-96.
tion of the patient’s human rights and well-being 3. Grisso T, Appelbaum PS. Assessing competence to consent to
first whenever there exists a conflict between the pa- treatment: a guide for physicians and other health professionals.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998:27.
tient’s human rights and the state’s interest.”14 The 4. United States v. Sell, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
report is a bit vague, and professional standards are 5. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
often couched in ambiguous language. Thus, foren- 6. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
7. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
sic psychiatrists and prison physicians may feel that 8. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
they can determine what is appropriate behavior for 9. Annas GJ. One flew over the Supreme Court. Hastings Cent Rep
themselves in specific instances. They all may un- 1990;20(3):28-30.
10. Stone A. The right to refuse treatment: Sell v. United States. Psyderstand intellectually that the needs and interests chiatric Times. September 1, 2003:1.
of the state’s criminal-justice system should never 11. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
be placed before the needs and interests of their in- 12. Schlafly P. Forced drugging by government. Eagle Forum.
March 27, 2002.
dividual patients. However, because of their own 13. Amicus brief in United States v. Sell, December 19, 2002.
identification with the state, which employs them, Arlington, Va.: American Psychiatric Association, 2002.
they may be able to persuade themselves too easily 14. International Dual Loyalty Working Group. Dual loyalty & human
rights in health professional practice: proposed guidelines & instithat the two are not really in conflict.9 As Justice tutional mechanisms. Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2003.
John Paul Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion in Copyright © 2004 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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